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is necessary to the particular result.H This proposal inures to the
benefit of the insured.
Each case seems to be a question of comparative analysis in which two
separate factors are present: (1) whether the means or causes were
accidental, and (2) whether the preexisting disease was a condition
contributing to the ultimate result. Additionally, "[t]he two basic
problems underlying all of the cases are the definition of accident and
34
the question of where to draw the line with respect to causation.
The myriad of degrees between death or disability caused wholly by
the accident, and death or disability caused solely by the preexisting
disease is limitless. "The need for some clear and easy-to-follow rule
which avoids both converting accident policies into life insurance and
reducing the coverage to an absurdity is fairly apparent."3 5
The present difficulty of predicting insured's rights in an action in
which both accident and preexisting disease combine to produce injury or death establishes a definite need for judicial guidance. It is not
so important which rule the courts adopt. Of primary importance is
the need of the claimant to have some basic guidelines to follow in
determining his right to recovery, rather than the present system
which provides only doubt and uncertainty.
Patricia Koch Irvine
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v. United States, 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
Plaintiffs, Dr. and Mrs. Hightower, brought action in the Tax Court
for refund of income tax deficiencies. Dr. Hightower in 1943, 1952, and
1961 purchased three adjoining parcels of real estate. Three buildings,
approximately 100 years old, were located on the land and were used

either for rental income or in relation with Dr. Hightower's medical
practice. In 1963 plaintiffs and Fidelity Building, Inc., agent for Fidelity Savings & Loan Association, entered into a lease for 99 years. The

lease gave the lessee the right to demolish the plaintiff's buildings. It
33 Comment, Pre-existing Disease and Accident Insurance: Pathology and Metaphysics
in the Common Speech of Men, 21 U. Cm. L. Rav. 266, 274 (1954).
34 Id. at 275. "Accident is an illusive needle in a semantic haystack, satisfactorily defined
only by example." Id. at 272.
35 Id. at 277.
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was known that Fidelity Savings 8c Loan Association wanted the
premises as a site for bank purposes. Both parties knew that Fidelity
would not have entered into the lease contract if there were no demolition rights. Subsequent to the lease the buildings were demolished and
a new building erected. In their 1964 income tax return the plaintiffs
claimed a loss deduction due to the demolition. The Tax Court held
for the plaintiffs and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed.
Held-Affirmed. Under a 99-year lease, a lessor, who permitted, but
did not require, his lessee to demolish his buildings and construct new
improvements, was entitled to a deductible demolition loss under section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to deduct
from his income tax during the taxable year a loss which is not compensated by insurance or otherwise.' The statute is silent, however, as
to losses arising from demolition of buildings. The Treasury Regulations do allow deductions arising from demolished buildings, 2 but the
loss must be an actual loss.3 It must be substantive and not merely
formative. 4 The burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove the statutory basis for his loss. 5
Hightower v. United States0 was primarily concerned with a taxpayer's privilege to deduct a loss for his demolished buildings pursuant
to Treasury Regulation 1.165-3(b)(2). 7 According to the Internal Revenue, prior to the adoption of the present regulation in dispute, it was
the position of the Service that established case law did not allow a
lessor-taxpayer to deduct demolition losses pursuant to a lease agree1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
(a) General rule-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during
the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
2Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (1960).
8 Holder v. United States, 444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971). See Stivers v. Commissioner, 360
F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1966) where the court sets out the four primary requirements that must
be met for the basis of a loss deduction.
4Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1960).
Nature of loss allowable. To be allowable as a deduction under Section 165(a), a
loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable
events, and, except as otherwise provided in section 165(h) and § 1.165-11, relating to
disaster losses ....
Only a bona fide loss is allowable. Substance and not form shall
govern in determining a deductible loss.
5 Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223, 227, 51 S. Ct. 413, 415, 75 L. Ed. 991, 994 (1931). See
generally 5 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.05 (1969).
6 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(2) (1960):
If a lessor or lessee of real property demolishes the buildings situated thereon
pursuant to the requirements of a lease or the requirements of an agreement which
resulted in a lease, no deduction shall be allowed to the lessor under section 165(a)
on account of the demolition of the old buildings. However, the adjusted basis of the
demolished buildings, increased by the net cost of demolition or decreased by the net
proceeds from demolition, shall be considered as a part of the cost of the lease to be
amortized over the term thereof.
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ment.8 It did not matter whether the lessee was permitted 9 or obligated'0 to demolish the lessor's buildings.
The crucial question, as far as the Internal Revenue is concerned, is
whether the present regulation changes the prior policy so as to liberalize it and allow a demolition loss, where, under a lease, the lessee has
the permission, but not the obligation, to destroy the lessor's buildings."
Prior to the adoption of the present regulation, the courts recognized
that if a taxpayer voluntarily destroyed his buildings he could get a
loss deduction.' 2 The courts, however, would look at the economic
circumstances of the transaction and if it were found that the demolition was in anticipation of a subsequently executed lease contract, no
deduction was allowed since the lessor sustained no actual loss.' 5 The
rationale of the prior cases was that the taxpayer allowed his buildings
to be cleared for the purpose and as part of the cost of obtaining or
securing a lease. The new asset compensated the lessor for the value of
the old asset, the demolished buildings. There was, in essence, a quid
pro quo or substitution of assets.' 4 The cost of acquiring an asset was
not deductible as a loss in the year in which it was paid or incurred. 15
Since the undepreciated value of the building destroyed contributed
to the cost of the new lease, the remaining undepreciated basis of the
cleared building had to be amortized over the terms of the lease.' 6
In 1959 the foundation for the present controversy was laid. In that
year the Internal Revenue proposed for the first time a new regulation
concerning demolition losses within the context of a lease. The Proposed regulation would have disallowed a deduction if the demolition
was "pursuant to the terms of a lease.' 1 The regulation finally
8

Rev. Rul. 67-410, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 93.

9 Blumenfeld Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 665 (1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 396

(9th Cir. 1956); Anahma Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 854 (1930).
10 Manning v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 286 (1927); accord, Spinks Realty Co. v. Burnet,
62 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 636 (1933); Smith Real Estate v. Page,
67 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1933); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 18
F. Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1937).
11 Rev. Rul. 67-410, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 93.
12 Dayton Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1937). See generally 5 J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.22 (1969).
13 Young v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 652 (1932).
14 Manning v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 286, 290 (1927).
15 Anahma Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 854 (1930).
16 Blumenfeld Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 665 (1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 396
(9th Cir. 1956).
17 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(d), 24 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8180 (1959). The original proposed regulation read:
Buildings demolished to obtain lease. If, pursuant to the terms of a lease, the lessor
of real property demolished buildings situated thereon, no deduction shall be allowed
to the lessor under section 165(a) on account of the demolition of the old buildings ....
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adopted' changed the wording from "pursuant to the terms of a lease"
to "pursuant to the requirements of a lease or the requirements of an
agreement which resulted in a lease." Since the adoption of the current
regulation the issue of allowing or denying a demolition loss growing
out of a lease agreement has arisen in four circuits. The courts for
these circuits have equally divided over the interpretation to be given
the current regulation.
The first case to apply the new regulation was Nickoll's Estate v.
Commissioner.'9 The lessee, although no mention as to demolition was
in the lease, was obligated in effect to demolish since he had to make
additions and improvements to the lessor's premises after gaining possession. Since the case arose prior to the adoption of the present regulation the taxpayer did not rely on it. Instead reliance was placed upon a
line of cases based on Union Bed & Spring Co. v. Commissioner20 which
stood for the proposition that if demolition occurred as a result of a plan
formed after the purchase of a building by a taxpayer, a demolition
loss was allowable. The court distinguished the Union Bed case on the
ground that it involved a purchase of land, not leases. Since the
Nickoll's case involved demolition under a lease, the court stated:
The old building was substantially demolished as a necessary condition precedent to the execution of a remunerative lease under
which taxpayers became the owner of a remodeled building. The
value of the old building which was partially demolished is proplease rights and is to
erly charged as a cost of acquiring valuable
21
be amortized over the life of the lease.
The court merely applied the reasoning of the prior case law and
stated further that this reasoning was 22consistent with the then recently
formulated regulation now disputed.
Four years after Nickoll's Estate, one of the two cases which has
generated the most discussion involving the present issue was decided.
In Feldman v. Wood 23 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
concerned with a 99-year lease whereby the lessee was given the right
to demolish for the purpose of providing for an additional parking area
and making other improvements. Two years after the lease was entered
into the buildings were removed. In Feldman the Internal Revenue
presented three arguments. The first was the familiar rationale of prior
18 T.D. 6445, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 93.
19 Nickoll's Estate v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1346 (1959), aff'd, 282 F.2d 895 (7th Cir.
1960).
20 39 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1930). See also Providence Journal Co. v. Broderick, 104 F.2d 614
(lst Cir. 1939); Liberty Baking Co. v. Heiner, 37 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1930); Lynchburg Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 670, aff'd, 208 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1953).
21 Nickoll's Estate v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1960).
22 Id. at 897.
23 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964).
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case law-the right to demolish was bargained for; it was part consideration for the lease; and there was a substitution of assets. Therefore no
loss under section 165 had been sustained. The court responded by
stating that the Internal Revenue's argument was not what the regulation said. Unless the demolition was "pursuant to the requirements" of
24
a lease, the alleged loss was allowable.
Secondly, the Internal Revenue argued that the word "requirements"
in a lease should include permissive demolition clauses. The court
disagreed. "A right to do an act is far different from a requirement to
''
do it. 25
Lastly, it was felt by the Service that to allow a deduction where the
lessee is permitted but not required to demolish would in effect allow
a deduction where no economic loss was really sustained. In these
instances the lessor really has no interest in the demolished building,
therefore no loss should be allowed. The argument was not persuasive.
The taxpayer still had an interest in the removed building because he
remained the owner and retained the capital investment in it. 2 6 The
court also took judicial notice of the earlier "purposes of the lease" test
applied in determining losses. But here the court believed that this test
was superseded by the "requirements of a lease" language found in the
regulation. Moreover, the court gave its interpretation of the regulation
by stating:
The question, then, is not whether demolition is economically
advantageous or disadvantageous to the owner. (We can hardly
conceive that an owner would agree to demolition unless he felt
it to be his financial advantage. The Code and Regulations must,
then, contemplate that there will be occasions where a financially
advantageous demolition may constitute a loss for tax purposes.)
The question, rather, would seem to be whether the property
demolished was then to be regarded as being used
by the taxpayer
27
in a trade or business for production of income.
Consequently the regulation would provide the necessary certainty
and answer the question whether the taxpayer regarded the removed
structures as still valuable or not. So, unless there was a mandatory
obligation in the lease that the lessee remove the lessor's buildings, the
regulation would presume that the parties bargained for both the land
and the beneficial use of the buildings, and not the land alone. Thus, a
28
loss deduction would be available.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lander24 Id. at 265.
25 Id. at 265.
26 Id. at 265.
27
28

Id. at 266.
Id. at 266.
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man v. Commissioner,29 which the Internal Revenue supports, is in

conflict with Feldman. The partnership-lessor in Landerman entered
into a 55-year lease which contained a right-to-demolish provision. The
lessee later exercised his option, cleared the premises, and erected a
parking garage and branch bank. Contending they were entitled to a
loss, the taxpayers relied heavily on Feldman. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit did not. This court held that the word "requirement" meant more than a formal obligation. The meaning of "requirement" was broad enough to include something wanted or needed, an
essential condition. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's construction in Feldman was too narrow. 0 The court in Landerman, as did
the Feldman court, acknowledged the previous case law in this area, but
further observed:
The principal focus of those decisions involved an inquiry into the
financial implications of each factual situation. Against the background of these cases and the evolution of the Regulations it
appears to us that the present regulation was designed to narrow,
but not alter, the focal point of determination to the contemplation
and bargaining stances of the parties at the time the lease arrangements were made.81
Therefore, the test, if it is a test, for deductibility of demolitions in the
Seventh Circuit depends upon the parties' intent to raze the buildings
at the time the lease was made. If the intent was to remove the buildings, the demolition would be a requirement of the lease and thus not
an allowable deduction. It also makes no difference whether the lessee
was or was not obligated to take down the lessor's buildings. The distinction was artificial because under either test the taxpayer has sustained no loss. He gave up his right to retain the buildings for acquiring
the lease rights. 8 2 It appears, then, that in the Seventh Circuit it is

extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a taxpayer ever to get a
demolition loss. This of course would seem to be in line with the earlier
case law.
Recently the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit joined the controversy. This court supports Landerman. In Foltz v. United States 3
the taxpayers had originally entered into negotiations with a municipal
parking authority. The authority wanted to lease the taxpayer's land
for the purpose of erecting a multi-story garage. The negotiations terminated, partly due to the fact that the taxpayer refused to include a
demolition clause in the lease. Subsequently the taxpayer entered into
29

454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, -

U.S. -

(June 6, 1972).

SO Id. at 340.

3lId. at 340-41.
82 Id. at 341.
83 458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
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a lease agreement with a bank whose negotiating representative was the
same individual who represented the parking authority. The lease provided for substantially higher rental payments than those payments
contemplated in the earlier negotiations. The lease contained a permissive demolition clause with the added condition that any improvements constructed after demolition had to have the lessor's written
consent. Unsurprisingly, the petitioners placed exclusive reliance on
Feldman. But here the court argued that to follow Feldman would be
to undermine the "underlying statutory mandate that only uncompensated losses be deductible, for a permissive demolition well might re'3 4
dound to the financial benefit of a lessor.
Justice Webster dissented in Foltz, however, and thought that Feldman should have been followed. He argued that the quid pro quo was
not the demolished building for the lease but the demolished building
35
for the lessor's obligation to build another structure.
The instant case, Hightower v. United States,6 was a case of first
impression in the Fifth Circuit. The court disagreed with Landerman
and felt the Feldman decision and the dissent in Foltz more consistent
37
with the regulation and not inconsistent with the Code.
In Hightower, the lessor knew that the lessee would not have entered
into the lease if there were no demolition rights. The right was essential
to the lessee because it was a virtual certainty that the lessee's principal,
Fidelity Savings & Loan Association, would construct a related banking
facility subsequent to demolition. But the court in Hightower held that
the lessee was permitted, not obligated, to demolish, therefore the lessor
could take his loss. The position of the Hightower court can be more
clearly seen by juxtaposing Holder v. United States38 with Feldman.

In Holder, the taxpayer entered into a lease contract which gave the
lessee the right but not the obligation to demolish. The district court,
relying on Feldman, allowed the taxpayer to deduct his loss. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court on the
ground that the taxpayer had failed to sustain a loss under section 165.
The court held that the taxpayer did not lose anything, basing its deci3 9 a presion in part on Blumenfeld Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner,
regulation case. The essential difference between the Hightower and
Holder cases is that in Hightower the lessee, after exercising his right
to demolish, was then under no formal obligation to rebuild. However,
in Holder, once the lessee exercised his right to demolish, he was then
34 Id. at 602.
35 Id. at 605.
36463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
37 Id. at 183.
38 444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971).
39 23 T.C. 665 (1955), afl'd, 232 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1956).
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obligated to construct buildings meeting certain specifications and certain cost expenditures.
The Feldman and Holder cases are difficult to distinguish. In both
cases the lessee
cases the lessee had the right to demolish and in both
40
right.
this
of
execution
upon
rebuild
to
duty
the
had
Feldman allowed a demolition loss but Holder did not. The implication, then, is that in the Fifth Circuit the emphasis is not exclusively
on the right or obligation to demolish but on the right or obligation to
rebuild in determining a demolition loss. This implication is contrary
to the holding in Feldman. The Feldman court did not require the
taxpayer to prove his loss. The regulation would presume and dictate
that he did sustain a loss, unless there was a mandatory obligation on
the lessee to demolish. The Feldman court did not and would not make
an examination into the transaction beyond the permission-obligation
dichotomy test. This test was sufficient and implied that form over
substance was the controlling factor. 41 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Holder made an inquiry and found no bona fide loss
had occurred.4 2 It appears therefore that in the Fifth Circuit a demolition loss pursuant to a lease agreement is a two-step process:
a. Is the lessee required to demolish?
b. Is there an obligation that the lessee rebuild?
A "yes" answer to either a or b would result in the court construing the
lease agreement as being made "pursuant to the requirements of a
lease." On the contrary, if both answers are "no" then the lessor can
claim his loss.
The present controversy among the several circuits would not have
arisen but for the ambiguous regulation. As stated earlier, the proposed
regulation read "pursuant to the terms of a lease." A possible answer to
why the wording of the adopted regulation was changed from "terms"
to "requirements" may be found in the 1959 hearings conducted to
solicit comments on the proposed regulation. At the hearings an argument was made that the scope of the proposed regulation, although the
language was precise, was too broad. It could have applied, for instance,
to a situation where an owner believed it profitable, for business reasons, to demolish improvements on his land for the purpose of leasing
the property generally before he entered into any serious negotiations
with a specific lessee.4 3 This argument may have been advanced in view
Brief for Appellee at 21, Hightower v. United States, 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
Feldman v. Wood, 335 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1964).
42 Holder v. United States, 444 F.2d 1257, 1300 (5th Cir. 1971): "Did taxpayers actually
sustain a bona fide loss? We think not and that to think otherwise would be to exalt form
over substance."
43 12 J. TAXATION 218, 220 (1960).
40
41
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of the holding in Berger v. Commissioner.44 In Berger the Tax Court
recognized the long standing rule that a lease was a substituting asset
for the demolished premises. This the court held did not mean that the
new asset had to be in existence at the time of demolition. If there were
a sufficient interrelationship between the razing of the building and a
subsequent lease agreement, no loss was allowable. Here the taxpayer
had a continuing purpose to lease her land for a parking lot. Therefore
it was immaterial that the taxpayer entered into a lease 7 months after
45
she demolished her building.
Consequently, the argument was made that the new rule be limited
to cases where demolition was bargained for in the lease negotiations.
The wording change was designed to narrow the scope of inquiry from
pre-lease demolitions where the taxpayer is negotiating generally46 to
cases where a taxpayer is negotiating with a specific lessee and demoli47
tion is bargained for.

Due to the division among the several circuits, the Treasury Department has recently proposed a new regulation which will remove the
permission-obligation distinction in lease contracts. 48 If and when
finally adopted, the Internal Revenue may have succeeded in locking,
not merely closing, the door on demolition losses within the context
of a lease.
Ron D'Addario
44 7 T.C. 1339 (1946).
Id.
If a lessor negotiates generally, he can get the benefit of competition among several
prospective lessees, and hopefully a more favorable lease.
47 12 J. TAXATION 218, 220 (1960).
48 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 7890, 7891 (1972). In order to clarify
the income tax treatment of the demolition of buildings situated on leased property, paragraph (b)(2) of section 1.165-3 of the Income Tax Regulations (26 CFR Part I) is amended
to read as follows:
§1.165-3 Demolition of Buildings
(b) Intent to demolish formed subsequent to the time of acquisition.
(2) If a lessor or lessee of real property demolishes his buildings situated thereon,
as required or permitted by a lease or by an agreement which resulted in a lease, no
deduction shall be allowed to the lessor under section 165(a) on account of the demolition of the old buildings. However, the adjusted basis of the demolished buildings,
increased by the net cost of demolition or decreased by the net proceeds from demolition, shall be considered as a part of the cost of the lease to be amortized over the
remaining term thereof.
45
46
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